The Limits of the UAE's Non-State Actor Strategy in Yemen: The Rise and Collapse of the Southern Transitional Council

Abstract

Following the Arab Spring, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) adopted a strategy of developing proxy partnerships with non-state armed actors in order to overcome the constraints stemming from its small-state capacity. The most advanced institutional implementation of this approach was carried out in Yemen, where the Southern Transitional Council (STC), established in May 2017, operated as the UAE’s principal proxy actor and was compelled to dissolve itself on 9 January 2026. The central question of this study is how the UAE’s proxy strategy pursued through the STC experienced a process of rise and collapse, and what this process reveals about the structural limits of this strategy. Positioning the STC as the primary actor, this study aims to fill a gap in the literature by examining the process in question through a holistic case analysis. The study was conducted within the framework of a qualitative research approach, employing the process tracing method. The findings demonstrate that the three core gains provided by the proxy strategy to the ‘patron’ state -capacity augmentation, capability acquisition, and plausible deniability- were progressively undermined in the STC case. The structural divergence between the strategic priorities of Saudi Arabia and the UAE regarding Yemen materialized in the Hadramawt theater, leading to the UAE’s withdrawal and the STC’s collapse. These findings demonstrate that the UAE’s proxy strategy is constrained by both small-state capacity and regional dynamics, while drawing attention to the continuing possibility that this strategy may regain its effectiveness in Yemen under favorable conditions.